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Chapter 1 Ethics ‘by and for professions’: the origins and endurance of club
regulation
Doctors and scientists successfully argued that they should be left to determine their own conduct during the nineteenth
and much of the twentieth centuries, in a form of self-governance that Michael Moran terms ‘club regulation’.  They
portrayed medical and scientific ethics as internal concerns in this period – produced ‘by and for’ colleagues and
mainly concerned with limiting intra-professional conflicts.  This view of ethics functioned as what Harold Perkin
calls a ‘strategy of closure’.  It helped doctors and scientists consolidate their professional expertise by delineating
boundaries, excluding unqualified groups and positioning themselves as the only people capable of providing an
essential service to government and the public.
This, of course, is not a new insight and several historians have shown how members of professions set their own
standards so as to exclude others.  In looking to explain why professions such as medicine gained control of their own
practices and codes of conduct, these studies adopt a largely internalist view, focusing on the professions in question
and portraying them as blocs or monopolies. When they look to external factors to explain club regulation, historians
generally chart how notions of professional self-governance resonated with the laissez-faire ideals of nineteenth-
century politicians. But this does not tell the whole story. As the sociologist Andrew Abbott argues, professions do not
emerge or evolve in isolation and we need to move from ‘an individualistic to a systemic view of professions’.  Abbott
endorses a more relational model, in which the acquisition of professional authority involves mediating jurisdictional
claims between different professions.
In following Abbott, we see that the history of club regulation hinges on the interdependence of professions. We
cannot fully account for the emergence and strength of club regulation without studying the ‘hands-off’ approach that
other professionals adopted when they considered medical and scientific practices. This is especially true of those
professions and academic fields that later constituted bioethics, such as law, philosophy and theology. On the rare
occasions that individuals from these fields did engage with science or medicine in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, they sought to consolidate the authority of doctors and scientists.
This stance persisted into the 1960s, despite a growing ‘backlash against professional society’.  Criticism of medical
research came instead from professional ‘whistleblowers’ such as Maurice Pappworth, who broke with club regulation
when he publicly rebuked doctors for experimenting on patients without consent and, crucially, demanded that
outsiders should play a role in formulating and administering a new statutory code for medical research. These factors
have led some to claim that Pappworth is a significant figure in ‘the birth of British bioethics’.  But while his work
attracted public attention, it ultimately had little impact on the continuing support for club regulation among doctors,
politicians and other professions. Despite Pappworth’s best efforts, outside involvement was dismissed as ‘quite
impracticable’ and doctors were left, as before, to determine their own conduct and ethical standards.
Enshrining club regulation: medical and scientific ethics as professional concerns
The emergence of club regulation in medicine and other professions resulted from social and economic changes during
the nineteenth century. Before this, doctors and other professionals operated under a system of ‘lay patronage’, in
which their actions were determined by a relatively small band of aristocratic and wealthy clients.  Ivan Waddington
argues that lay patronage fostered a model ‘not of colleague control, but of client control’, in which the patient’s
superior social status allowed them to dictate their own needs ‘and the manner in which those needs are to be met’.  As
Roy Porter states, this ensured that ‘for authority and status, reward and advancement, doctors looked not to collective
professional paths to glory, but to the personal favour of grandees’.
Lay patronage also meant that medical practitioners showed greater loyalty to their clients than to their colleagues, and
that the ‘solidarity of the occupational group was relatively under-developed’.  As part of a thriving ‘medical
marketplace’, orthodox practitioners such as physicians, surgeons and apothecaries competed for patients with each
other and with a variety of alternative healthcare providers, such as homeopathists, mesmerists and bone-setters.  In a
period marked by high consumer choice and ‘low professionalisation’, when distinctions between ‘regular and
irregular’ practitioners were unclear and a new division between general practitioners and hospital consultants
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These disputes and rivalries, which hinged on arguments over competition and the new division of labour, led some
physicians to write professional codes of ethics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Their
guidelines notably differed from previous recommendations for medical practitioners, which were indistinguishable
from the general ‘advice to gentlemen’ published in conduct manuals.  While these early modern codes focused on
individual manners and conduct, especially in client–patron relations, newer guidelines such as Thomas Percival’s
1803 Medical Ethics dwelt far more on smoothing relations between practitioners in order to forestall professional
conflict. Percival’s code is notable for introducing the term ‘medical ethics’, but it is perhaps more significant in
another respect.  In order to restrict the power of lay hospital governors, who physicians believed were interfering in
running the Manchester Infirmary, Percival’s Medical Ethics stressed the collective autonomy of medical practitioners
and the need for ‘collaborative self-regulation’.  To Percival, ‘medical ethics’ denoted a set of professional, not
public, concerns.
Percival’s view of medical ethics was adopted by a later generation of reformers who sought from the 1820s to portray
medicine as a discrete and socially valuable profession. These reformers dwelt less on notions of gentlemanly virtue
and more on their possession of specialist knowledge and authority.  They promoted their ‘scientific’ training in
anatomy, chemistry and pathology, and argued that they alone possessed the expertise to care for the changing ‘social
body’ created by industrialisation and urbanisation.  Calling for government restrictions on alternative practitioners,
whose services were popular among the urban population, they argued that their reward for combating diseases such as
cholera should be freedom to practise without outside interference. Physicians exploited the social capital they gained
through public health measures by arguing that the state should restrict care of the population ‘to those with recognised
qualifications, talents and abilities’, and these arguments were later helped by advances in anaesthetics and germ
theory.  Codes and associations that bore the term ‘medical ethics’ were integral to this reforming campaign, helping
to strengthen professional unity, consolidating expertise vis-à-vis the public and politicians and excluding unorthodox
practitioners. This meant that when doctors established regional associations such as the Manchester Medico-Ethical
Society, they functioned as ‘a trade union in disguise’.
Arguments for professional self-control resonated with Victorian politicians who espoused laissez-faire ideals of liberal
self-governance.  Political support for medical reform was also strengthened by the fact that orthodox doctors, like
many other professionals, became increasingly central to the machinery of a growing Victorian state from the mid
nineteenth century onwards.  In an era when professional expertise was ‘inextricably linked to the formal political
apparatus of rule’, doctors worked as Poor Law officers, factory medical inspectors or prison doctors, and were later
central to the administration of the 1853 Compulsory Vaccination Act and the 1864 Contagious Diseases Act.  The
demand for medical expertise, in turn, led politicians to recruit doctors into the expanding civil service. The first Chief
Medical Officer (CMO) was appointed in 1855 and was soon supported by a team of medically qualified civil servants.
In addition to providing expert advice, these civil servants furthered professional interests by ensuring that the state
directed funds to medical programmes without compromising the independence of doctors.
With doctors increasingly central to government policy, and politicians committed to notions of self-governance, it was
no surprise that the 1858 Medical Act recognised medicine as a unitary and autonomous profession. The Medical Act
distinguished orthodox from alternative practitioners by requiring the creation of a register of qualified doctors (though
it did not forbid alternative practitioners from practising). It also granted doctors a significant degree of ‘self-governing
authority’ by leaving them in charge of the new General Medical Council (GMC) that controlled registration,
education and discipline.  Politicians then withdrew from the issue of medical regulation and only intervened on the
rare occasions when doctors requested it themselves.
Although politicians granted the GMC formal disciplinary powers, it did not issue a binding set of ethical guidelines.
Registered doctors were given no written guidance on professional conduct until 1883, when the GMC began to issue a
series of ‘warning notices’.  These arose from disciplinary rulings and specified conduct that the GMC considered
unacceptable enough to warrant the removal of a doctor from the medical register. By the turn of the twentieth century,
the warning notices encompassed improper or fraudulent acquisition of qualifications, advertising or canvassing,
sexual misconduct such as committing adultery with patients, publishing indecent work, abortion, drunkenness and
improperly disclosing confidential patient information.  The twenty-four members of the GMC who were eligible to
reach these decisions were all medically qualified, reaffirming that medical ethics was seen as a solely professional
matter.
The reluctance to issue binding ethical guidelines was mirrored by the British Medical Association (BMA), which
represented the interests of doctors after its formation in 1836.  During the 1850s the BMA appointed two ethics
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1847 set of guidelines based on Percival’s Medical Ethics.  Neither group actually met or produced a code, but Jukes
de Styrap, a member of the second BMA committee and chair of the Shropshire medico-ethical association, updated
Percival’s guidelines to produce his own Code of Medical Ethics in 1878. Like Percival, de Styrap aimed ‘to promote
harmony and prevent disputes within the profession’.  His main ethical precept, the so-called ‘Golden Rule’, drew on
the biblical injunction to ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ – although this applied to a doctor’s
relations with their colleagues far more than it did to their patients.  De Styrap viewed the Golden Rule as vital to
establishing a ‘generous esprit de corps’ and stressed it should be every doctor’s aim to ‘raise our profession, not only
by our scientific labours, and the careful and accurate study of disease and its remedies, but by our feeling of
brotherhood and mutual support – so that the public may respect us as a body at unity within itself’.
As this quote indicates, the stress on professional relationships did not mean that writers on medical ethics ignored the
interests of patients and the public. For de Styrap, the professional and the public interest were firmly linked, and
patients were best served by a unified medical profession that avoided ‘public rancour’, refrained from activities such
as advertising and was clearly distinguished from ‘tradesmen and quacks’.  By highlighting their ‘scientific’ training
and professional authority, de Styrap also stressed that patients were best served by leaving decisions to doctors, since
they alone possessed the expertise to evaluate the benefits or drawbacks of specific procedures.
This view of medical ethics persisted well into the twentieth century. The only writers on the subject were doctors such
as Robert Saundby, who continued to argue that medical professionals were the best judges of a patient’s interests.  It
was also evident in new committees and survived reforms that admitted laypeople to the GMC. In 1902 the BMA
underwent reform that resulted in the creation of a Central Ethical Committee (CEC), following tensions between
doctors and mutual aid societies, who provided healthcare in return for members’ contributions and were eventually
organised under government control by the 1911 National Health Insurance Act.  The CEC was established to issue
guidance to local BMA branches, and to draw up reports or sets of rules for difficult issues. Its creation notably was
‘the first time doctors in Britain had a national body to examine questions of conduct without resorting to extremes of
hearings before the GMC’.
But while it was new a body, the CEC embodied the traditional view that medical ethics was produced ‘by and for’
doctors.  Its meetings focused on advertising, contract disputes and confidentiality, and its members were drawn from
the senior ranks of the medical profession. This ethos also persisted in the GMC, despite the appointment of the former
politician Sir Edward Young as its first layman following a public outcry at the treatment of F. W. Axham, who was
removed from the medical register for working with the osteopath Sir Herbert Barker. Young and successive lay
members were generally the only non-doctors on the GMC and exerted little, if any, influence over its decision-
making.
Yet we should not presume that relations between doctors and patients were completely paternalistic. They were
certainly not as one-sided as is implied by some historical accounts, particularly those written by bioethicists. We need
to see these participant histories as rhetorical efforts to differentiate bioethics from ‘old’ and problematic styles of
medical ethics and, having done so, to ‘open up a space for intervention and reform of unsatisfactory relationships’.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in a partially regulated ‘medical marketplace’, patients were
certainly free to select doctors for private practice and mutual aid schemes. Jukes de Styrap reminded readers of this in
his third edition of Medical Ethics, where he claimed that ‘the right of a patient to change or to discard his doctor is
unquestionable’.  This principle also applied in National Insurance schemes from 1911 onwards, which incorporated
provisions for ‘free choice of doctor’ at the BMA’s insistence.
But this measure of autonomy and the emphasis on professional expertise did not guarantee public trust. The
connections between orthodox doctors and the Poor Law authorities ensured that many working-class people viewed
them with suspicion following the 1858 Medical Act, and continued to rely on alternative therapies when they fell ill.
Alternative practitioners played on this by claiming that ‘orthodox medicine was a tyrannical system of state-
sanctioned interference with the lives and health of an oppressed people’.  These suspicions found expression in the
anti-vaccination movement, in which supporters of alternative medicine joined with large sections of the working and
middle classes to argue that the 1853 Compulsory Vaccination Act infringed on an individual’s right to govern their
own homes and families.
Doctors also faced resistance thanks to their association with the 1864 Contagious Diseases Act, which permitted
compulsory examination of any suspected prostitute, and their detention in ‘lock’ hospitals should they be infected.
Feminist and socialist reformers argued that these Acts represented state-sanctioned infringement upon the bodies and
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linking the plights of defenceless animals and women, and portraying medical researchers as indifferent to the
suffering they caused to those less fortunate.  While these movements differed in some respects, they all resisted the
growing authority of doctors and scientists, and criticised the fact that politicians increasingly gave them licence to
‘dictate morality and personal behaviour’.
But this ultimately had little impact on state support for medical or scientific expertise. Indeed, the political response to
these popular movements effectively consolidated club regulation. When the government convened a Royal
Commission on Vaccination in 1889, for example, they filled it ‘with eminent medical practitioners who almost
unanimously supported vaccination’.  In 1896 the Commission proposed the introduction of a conscientious objection
clause that significantly weakened the anti-vaccination movement, since individuals could now simply ‘opt out’ by
obtaining an exemption certificate.
The government’s 1875 Royal Commission on Vivisection also increased professional authority in the biological
sciences, albeit less directly. This Commission was more balanced between scientists, representatives from the Royal
Society for the Protection of Animals (RSPCA) and individuals ‘uncommitted to either side’.  Its composition
reflected how researchers in fields such as physiology lacked a ‘meaningful professional identity’ in the 1870s, with
less political influence than doctors or campaign groups such as the RSPCA.  But their response to the Commission’s
recommendations, which underpinned the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, galvanised biological scientists into acting as
a more coherent and influential body from the 1880s onwards. The Cruelty to Animals Act angered many biologists by
ruling that Home Office officials should decide whether or not to issue licences permitting animal experiments.
Figures such as Richard Owen, who had previously opposed vivisection for teaching purposes, now condemned
politicians for undermining ‘the expertise and thus authority of his profession’.  Like doctors before them, biologists
formed groups to endorse self-regulation, such as the Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research
(AAMR).
Members of the AAMR, which united physiologists, botanists and zoologists, argued that they were ‘better judges than
an average person in matters of research and its moral aspects, “because they possessed the additional knowledge
indispensible to form a correct judgement”’.  Their efforts were certainly influential. In 1883 the government decided
the AAMR should review all licence applications before they were passed to the Home Office, which led to a
significant increase in licence approvals.  Professional control over animal experiments increased further after 1913,
when a second Royal Commission, now weighted in favour of scientists, recommended that a new advisory body
should consider licence applications. Members of this Home Office advisory committee were selected by the Home
Secretary from a list of names submitted by solely professional bodies such as the Royal Society and the Royal
Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons. From 1913 to the late 1970s, the advisory committee always consisted of ten
scientists and one lawyer.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, it approved the vast majority of licence applications and played a
major role in encouraging the growth of biological disciplines such as pathology, pharmacology and bacteriology.
Biologists also benefited from increasing control over how the government distributed funding for research. In 1913,
following concerns over infant mortality raised by a Royal Commission on Tuberculosis, the government formed a
Medical Research Committee that was administered under the 1911 National Insurance Act. Although the committee
was expected to focus on tuberculosis, it soon became dominated by Cambridge physiologists who helped ‘establish a
presence within government for the elites of British science and education’.  In its early years, and following its
reconstitution as the Medical Research Council (MRC) in 1919, these influential scientists were able to distribute
money without political interference, using it to free biological sciences from clinical concerns and encourage research
into basic problems.
The interwar period also saw a decline in organised public opposition to medical or scientific authority. Conscientious
objection clauses effectively killed off the anti-vaccination movement, while the anti-vivisection cause was dealt a
blow after scientists argued that new drugs such as Salvarsan proved the value of animal experiments. At the same
time, although conventional treatments were expensive and often ineffective, orthodox medicine gradually won public
acceptance.  With increasing state investment and declining public opposition, some doctors and biological scientists
promoted their expertise with greater confidence during the 1920s and 1930s. They not only objected to involving
laypeople in professional debates, but now asserted a ‘far more comprehensive authority [in] determining the shape of
things to come’.  A new generation of ‘public’ biologists such as Julian Huxley, Conrad Waddington and J. B. S.
Haldane used popular outlets such as newspapers, magazines, radio and science-fiction stories to assert that human
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Calls for greater professional influence over social and moral issues permeated the eugenics movement, in which
scientists and doctors sought to counter evolutionary ‘degeneration’ by controlling the reproduction of supposedly
inferior groups.  They were also evident in works such as Conrad Waddington’s Science and Ethics, which originally
appeared as an essay in Nature and argued that biologists with knowledge of evolution and the human mind could
make a decisive contribution ‘to the study of ethics’.  Waddington claimed that biologists were in a better position to
study ethics than philosophers or theologians, since they possessed the expertise to reposition notions such as ‘good’ as
‘facts of the kind with which science deals’.  He outlined how scientists could define ethical principles as ‘actual
psychological principles derived from experience’, and could also demonstrate how ‘the real good cannot be other than
that which has been effective, namely that which is exemplified in the course of evolution’.
Not everyone welcomed these incursions into social and moral affairs. Some scientists maintained that they simply
studied natural phenomena and argued it was not their place to assert their work’s relevance to ‘questions of personal
or corporate morality’.  This view proved attractive to many ‘because it protected the freedom of scientists to pursue
their work without fear of external controls’.  Criticism also came from a small but high-profile group of elite critics,
such as F. R. Leavis and Hilaire Belloc, who extolled traditional ways of life and equated science with moral and
political decline. Lamenting the waning influence of ‘humanist’ scholars, they argued that scientists had narrow
expertise and were ill-equipped to discuss matters outside their specialism. For them, ‘questions concerning both the
ends of scientific applications and the desirability of progress, were to the humanist’s mind not for the scientist qua
scientist to answer’.  Yet this criticism again hinged on the belief that professionals should stay within their bounds of
expertise. Critics such as Leavis and Belloc accepted the judgements of scientists ‘in their own sphere’, and did not
believe that outsiders should determine scientific or medical conduct.
Perhaps the only advocate of external involvement with medicine or science in this period was the playwright George
Bernard Shaw, who remained a committed anti-vivisectionist and supporter of alternative medicine until his death in
1950. In his 1909 play The Doctor’s Dilemma and a series of later essays, Shaw argued that doctors were motivated by
profit and ‘professional trade interest’ rather than a concern for patients and the public.  This, he concluded, led to a
‘dogmatic’ exclusion of alternative therapies and ensured that ‘what is called scientific progressive medicine is thus
seen to be largely dictated by the hygiene of the pocket’.  Shaw was not criticising professional authority per se here.
He advocated professional expertise providing it was harnessed for the greater social good, as evidenced by his support
for the eugenics movement and membership of the socialist Fabian Society, which ‘embraced a scientistic form of
politics’.  This desire for socially useful expertise led Shaw to propose reforms that he believed would foster a more
‘disinterested’ and trustworthy medical profession. These included establishing a ‘state medical service’ and, notably,
reconstituting the GMC so that it included ‘a majority of laymen’.  Shaw argued that this latter measure was vital
since ‘all trade union experience shows that the doors of a trade or profession must not be guarded, either for entrance
or exit, by the members inside’.  In contrast to de Styrap and others, who believed they were mutually enforcing,
Shaw concluded that the ‘protection of the laity’ and ‘the progress of science’ were incompatible with club
regulation.
Despite Shaw’s profile, doctors and politicians overwhelmingly rejected any form of outside involvement. Following
the Second World War, for example, the BMA and the British Medical Journal often portrayed Nazi medical crimes as
a direct result of outside interference.  When Clement Attlee’s Labour government sought to implement its 1946
National Health Service Act, doctors agreed to reform on the condition that ‘there should be as little scrutiny as
possible of their privileged clinical position or research practices’.  Politicians were wary of challenging a profession
that had a high standing in the eyes of the public, and gave doctors a significant degree of autonomy when they
established the NHS in 1948.  This agreement ensured that while the state allocated resources for the care of the
population in the NHS, doctors retained control over their own practices and how resources were allocated.
As before, this control encompassed clinical treatment and medical research. Doctors presumed that citizens would
support biomedical research and contribute to medical progress by willingly offering their bodies in exchange for the
‘protection against deprivation, ignorance and disease’ they received from the welfare state.  There was little
discussion of whether patient consent was needed for research, or whether doctors required any outside supervision.
With the creation of the NHS boosting public trust, the doctor was widely perceived not only ‘as an expert but also a
gentleman whose inherent integrity and good character prevent him or her from any wrongdoing’.
So while Shaw’s vision of a ‘state medical service’ was realised in his lifetime, he did not get his wish for greater
outside involvement in setting standards for doctors. Club regulation also persisted in science, despite the arguments of
Marxist scientists such as J. D. Bernal. In his 1939 book The Social Function of Science, Bernal had claimed that
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science, ‘as is already occurring in the Soviet Union’.  Although Bernal received support from left-wing scientists
such as Joseph Needham, many others argued that scientific progress could only be guaranteed by giving researchers
the freedom to make their own decisions and regulate their own conduct.  Figures such as the émigré chemist Michael
Polanyi, who co-founded a Society for Freedom in Science in 1940, maintained that science could only thrive in a
liberal society and free from outside interference.  These arguments were strengthened following the Second World
War, when it became clear that Soviet efforts to control genetics involved the arrest and execution of scientists opposed
to Trofim Lysenko, who fraudulently claimed to have perfected a way of increasing crop yields and transmitting
acquired characteristics to later generations.  Supporters of scientific freedom argued that the collapse of Soviet
genetics and agriculture proved just how harmful external interference was for science.
Support for club regulation was strengthened further during the 1950s, thanks to advances in biological and medical
research such as the development of effective anti-tuberculosis drugs, open-heart surgery, kidney transplantation and
the discovery of DNA’s helical structure. These successful projects involved no external planning and were all
‘developed through the single-minded efforts of a few dedicated individual scientists and doctors’.  At a time when
professions were highly regarded, this research further increased public confidence in science and medicine.
Celebratory media coverage portrayed doctors and scientists as pioneering figures who were central to a ‘new
Elizabethan era’ of progress and discovery.  When ‘science and expertise were synonymous’, both in public and in
government, the future of club regulation seemed more assured than ever.
Compounding club regulation: other professions and ‘doctor knows best’
Historians have thus far explained the growth of club regulation by detailing how the professional desire for autonomy
mapped on to the laissez-faire attitude of politicians, and examining how the expertise of doctors and scientists became
central to government policy from the mid nineteenth century onwards. But we cannot fully account for club regulation
without also examining attitudes in other professions. As we shall see, medical and scientific ethics were also seen as
professional concerns thanks to the overwhelmingly ‘hands-off’ approach in the fields that later constituted bioethics,
such as law, philosophy and theology.
This stance partly reflected the broad support for technical expertise during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; but
it also reflected factors that were specific to each of these fields. This was certainly the case in law, where laissez-faire
attitudes to medicine were most evident. From the eighteenth century onwards it was extremely rare for the courts to
adjudicate in medical malpractice cases. This was largely because the legal system adapted itself to the rules of the
market and, in doing so, ‘became unwilling to interfere with the freedom of trade’.  This stance was compounded in
the nineteenth century when lawyers, like doctors, reorganised themselves to ‘control competition in the new markets
opened up by industrialism’.  They exploited statute and common laws to establish monopolies and rebuilt their
governing institutions, such as the Inns of Court and the Law Society, to organise training and discipline with a high
degree of autonomy from the state. One bastion of club regulation was hardly likely to interfere with the affairs of
another, especially after the 1858 Medical Act formally entrusted doctors with the power to regulate themselves.
In the rare instances when the courts did consider medical practices, they sought not to challenge but to strengthen
medical authority. Abortion was the only operative procedure governed by law during the nineteenth century, with the
1861 Offences Against the Person Act specifying that any attempt to induce miscarriage was punishable by life
imprisonment. But this was less about regulating doctors, who were free to perform an abortion if they believed it
would save a woman’s life, and more about prohibiting the activities of ‘backstreet’ abortionists who offered
competing systems of healthcare.  While doctors believed that the law should ‘interfere as little as possible with
clinical practice’, they nevertheless supported legislation to ‘retain medical control of abortion and to exclude the
“racketeer who has brought such discredit upon our profession”’.
The decisions from two 1950s medical negligence cases demonstrate how lawyers and judges continued to believe that
‘the medical profession should be held in special regard and interfered with by the law as little as possible’.  The first,
Hatcher v. Black, arose in 1954 after a patient claimed that they were not informed about possible nerve damage in
thyroid surgery. Ruling in favour of the doctors, the judge, Alfred Denning, argued that ‘we should be doing a
disservice to the community at large if we were to impose liability on hospitals and doctors for everything that goes
wrong’. Denning warned that giving courts the power to decide what constituted negligent behaviour would lead to
‘defensive medicine’, where doctors thought ‘more of their own safety than of the good of their patients’.  This, he
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The second case, Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, arose in 1957 when a patient sued doctors for
injuries that arose after they failed to restrain him during electroconvulsive therapy.  Here, as in Denning, the courts
ruled in favour of the doctors rather than the patient. Their decision hinged not on the possibility of ‘defensive
medicine’ but on the argument that the patient’s treatment conformed to standard medical practices. This ruling
became known as the ‘Bolam test’ and was applied to all subsequent medical negligence claims.  As the lawyer
Margaret Brazier notes, by deciding that medical conduct should be judged according to professional norms, and not
the expectations of patients or the public, the Bolam test affirmed that ‘the underlying trend in the English courts was
that “doctor knows best”’.
While philosophers took a similarly ‘hands-off’ stance, they did so for different reasons. During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, work on ethics had formed a major component of philosophy. British philosophers such as David
Hume, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill claimed that acts should be guided by notions of sympathy, natural or
individual rights and the utilitarian faith in increasing the happiness of the greatest number of people; and some of
these ideas, especially Hume’s work on sympathy, influenced codes of medical ethics circa 1800.  During the early
twentieth century, however, philosophers abandoned work on ethics and refused to state how things ought to be. This
shift involved a rejection of the previous belief that notions such as ‘good’ or ‘right’ could be objectively determined,
which John Dewey had encapsulated when he defined ethics as ‘the science that deals with conduct, in so far as this is
concerned as right or wrong, good or bad’.
In his 1903 book Principia Ethica, the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore argued that ethics was not a science since
‘good’ and ‘right’ were indefinable categories that could not be empirically verified.  Moore coined the term
‘naturalistic fallacy’ to describe the seemingly mistaken belief that a certain action could be objectively shown to be
‘good’ in the same way that, say, blood could be shown to flow around the body.  He argued that while we may
recognise that something is intrinsically good, just as we recognise something is yellow, we cannot then prove it really
was ‘good’ in order to specify what kinds of actions we should perform.
Moore’s argument underpinned the redefinition of philosophy as a more objective field that was free of any political,
nationalistic or religious bias.  Following Principia Ethica, philosophers adopted an approach that Bertrand Russell
called ‘modern analytical empiricism’, which centred solely on clarifying the properties of logical or moral
propositions. Russell argued that this method distanced philosophy from the doctrinaire and incommensurable notions
of ‘good’ that had been disastrously employed during the First World War, and gave it the objective ‘quality of science
… by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much
divested of local and temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings’.  Rather than challenge science, then,
prominent philosophers such as Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to emulate it. They viewed philosophy as a
‘disinterested search for truth’, and believed that anyone who made a normative statement was committing ‘a kind of
treachery’.
This position was reaffirmed by the young Alfred J. Ayer, whose 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic was widely
credited with having ‘a huge influence on people’s notion of what ethics is all about’.  Ayer took Moore and
Russell’s stance to its logical conclusion when he endorsed a highly subjectivist view of ethics, claiming that moral
statements were ‘simply expressions of emotion that can be neither true nor false’.  Since philosophers only studied
verifiable and ‘genuine propositions’, he argued, ‘a strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no
ethical pronouncements’.  What was more, Ayer also believed that since ethical statements were unverifiable
expressions ‘with no objective validity’, and since there was ‘no relevant empirical test’ to resolve competing claims, it
was misleading for a philosopher or anyone else to ‘set themselves up as arbiters of right and wrong’.
As he increasingly became a ‘public intellectual’ and appeared on television and the radio from the 1950s, Ayer found
himself in the ironic position where ‘the authority of his public role rested on his professional identity as a philosopher,
but his declared philosophical position was that philosophy could have little to say on issues that were of public
interest’.  Ayer made this clear in his 1965 Philosophical Essays, when he stated that ‘to analyse moral judgements is
not itself to moralise’ and warned that members of the public would be disappointed if ‘they mistakenly look to the
philosopher as a champion of virtue’.  Over fifty years after Principia Ethica had been published, Ayer ensured that
this austere view of ethics remained paradigmatic. As Mary Warnock outlined in 1960, it ‘seemed as if there were no
other virtue in a moral philosopher except that he should avoid the naturalistic fallacy’.  Moral philosophy had
become defined, she argued, by ‘the refusal of philosophers in England to commit themselves to moral opinions’.
This gave scientists and doctors freedom to discuss ethics in their own fields and more generally. On the rare occasions
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normative issues. For instance, when Conrad Waddington told Ludwig Wittgenstein that he was writing Science and
Ethics, the horrified philosopher replied that it was ‘a terrible business – just terrible! You can at best stammer when
you talk of it.’  C. E. M. Joad was the only philosopher who responded to Waddington’s essay, in the journal Nature,
yet this was only to criticise him for presuming that notions such as ‘good’ could be objectively measured.  And
when the CIBA Foundation convened a 1963 symposium on ‘Man and His Future’, which examined whether
biological research might ‘reshape traditional grounds for ethical beliefs’, there were no philosophers in attendance.
Religious figures, on the other hand, were more prepared to discuss science and medicine. While no philosophers or
lawyers attended the ‘Man and His Future’ symposium, the predominantly scientific audience was joined by the Revd
H. C. Trowell, curate of Stratford-Sub-Castle, who discussed food allocation and family planning in the developing
world.  Theologians and the clergy were also second only to scientists and doctors in responding to Science and
Ethics. In line with the complexity that had long characterised relations between religion and science, attitudes here
were less uniform than in law or philosophy. Some religious figures opposed what they saw as Waddington’s attempts
to portray science as a secular religion. The Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, for example, claimed that Science and Ethics
was a ‘disastrous error’ and asserted that morality came ‘from a Source deeper and more intimate than the course of
evolution’.  Others, meanwhile, claimed that science and religion could not conflict because ‘they were quite
separate provinces’.  This position was endorsed by philosophers such as Ayer, who claimed in Language, Truth and
Logic that ‘there was no logical ground for antagonism between religion and natural science’, because ‘since religious
utterances are not genuine propositions at all, they cannot stand in logical opposition to the propositions of science’.
But a significant proportion also sought to assimilate religious and scientific worldviews. This had been a longstanding
tactic within the Church of England, especially in efforts to reconcile religion and evolutionary theories, and the
tendency increased after the 1920s when modernising figures such as William Temple, later Archbishop of Canterbury,
argued that theologians needed to engage with contemporary issues to ensure they were not ‘isolated from the
mainstream of public life’.  This belief led to greater discussions of how Christian faith related to political, economic
and scientific concerns, and was evident when Ernest Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham and a former mathematician,
wrote to Nature expressing his ‘fundamental agreement’ with Science and Ethics. There was no reason, Barnes argued,
why evolutionary and ethical progress could not both be seen as evidence of God’s ‘progressive revelation of
Himself’.
From the late 1930s onwards many clergy and Christian intellectuals believed this ‘synthesis’ could be achieved by
working with doctors, scientists and others to discuss common concerns, and endorsed collaboration in small
interdisciplinary groups.  In 1938, for example, the ecumenist J. H. Oldham co-founded the ‘Moot’ group with
Anglican clergymen such as Alec Vidler and Daniel T. Jenkins, Christian intellectuals such as the poet T. S. Eliot, the
sociologist Karl Mannheim and the educationalist Walter Moberly.  The Moot group discussed a wide range of
issues, including relations between science and religion, and sought to ensure that Christian values were at the
forefront of postwar social reconstruction. Despite its illustrious background, however, the Moot’s emphasis on elite
leadership was unfashionable in the egalitarian welfare state and it disbanded after Mannheim died in 1947.
While William Temple was not a member of Moot, his enthusiasm for interdisciplinary groups was evident shortly
before his death in 1944, when he established the Churches’ Council of Healing (CCH) ‘to bring together the churches
and the medical profession’.  Temple saw collaboration here as vital since the physical, mental and spiritual aspects
of healing were ‘so interdependent that successful treatment of disease in one was not possible without consideration
of the others’.  He also argued that doctors stood to benefit from cooperating with theologians ‘in the study and
performance of their respective functions in the work of healing’, as they would receive valuable help in assisting those
patients who believed that ‘religious ministrations will conduce to health and peace of mind’.
The BMA initially questioned the ‘propriety of the association of doctors with clergy as unqualified persons’, and
sought assurances that the CCH had no desire to ‘overlap the realm of physical or psychiatric medicine’ and was not
advocating ‘unscientific’ methods such as faith healing.  But after meeting a deputation headed by the Bishop of
Croydon, they claimed that there was ‘no ethical reason to prevent medical practitioners co-operating with the clergy’
and supported appointing BMA representatives as ex officio CCH members.  The BMA council also broadened this
proposal and endorsed ‘fuller co-operation’, in which ‘medicine and the Church working together should encourage a
dynamic philosophy of health which would enable every citizen to find a way of life based on moral principle and a
sound knowledge of the factors which promote health and well-being’.
The BMA’s belief that collaboration with theologians was ‘necessary and desirable’ might appear surprising, as club
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religious figures ultimately strengthened their professional authority. This partly stemmed from a hope that they would
reconcile doctors to the changing landscape of the new welfare state. In a letter to the British Medical Journal, which
followed a report on the CCH, one doctor outlined how they and their colleagues feared being ‘grossly overworked’ in
the new NHS because ‘patients will be entitled to medical advice without a fee and will consult their doctor far more
readily’.  These worries were also expressed by medical practitioners in early meetings of the Frontier Medical
Group (FMG), which was co-founded by Christian doctors and some Moot clergymen, such as Daniel Jenkins and
Alec Vidler.  The meetings prompted Jenkins to write a 1949 book on The Doctor’s Profession, in which he claimed
that the ‘establishment of a National Health Service’ forced doctors ‘to reckon with even greater interest in [their]
activities on the part of the community’, but left them too overworked to fully consider ethical issues.  While Jenkins
acknowledged that it was unusual for a book on medicine to ‘be written not by a doctor but by a theologian’, he argued
that doctors were now simply ‘too busy to write books of this kind’.
Jenkins outlined how Christian doctors increasingly sought advice from theologians because the NHS placed new
demands on ‘an already overcrowded life’.  These concerns ensured that The Doctor’s Profession was one of several
books written for denominational audiences in the late 1940s, which aimed to show that it was possible ‘to be a doctor
and a good Christian’ in the welfare state.  This trend increased during the 1950s, as Christian doctors ‘demanded to
know what their options were’ in the face of growing public demand for contraceptives, an increase in artificial
insemination and the questions raised by new artificial respirators about whether withdrawing treatment from
‘hopeless’ cases conflicted with the ‘Christian’s reverence for life’.
At the same time, doctors also welcomed the input of theologians because they positioned themselves as ancillaries to
the medical profession. They saw their job as to clarify religious views on particular issues, not to criticise doctors or
influence decision-making. William Temple, for one, argued that theologians should elucidate general principles
‘according to which precise policy might be formulated’, and held that it was not for them to ‘argue how principles
should be put into practice’.  This stance was also clear in The Doctor’s Profession, in which Jenkins provided no
direct advice and stressed that it was ‘clearly not the function of a book of this kind to pass judgement’.  Like
philosophers and lawyers, Temple, Jenkins and other theologians ultimately believed that medical decisions were for
doctors alone to make.
Criticising club regulation and ‘the birth of bioethics’?
At the start of the 1960s no-one argued that scientists or doctors required any external supervision. But this was to
change over the course of the decade, which witnessed the beginnings of what Harold Perkin calls a ‘backlash against
professional society’.  Scientists and doctors were no longer seen as ‘the god-like functionaries, beyond questioning
much less criticism, they had once been’, and public debates increasingly centred on the drawbacks as much as the
benefits of research.  While distrust of medical or scientific authority was nothing new, of course, it had previously
come from specific campaign groups or elite critics such as George Bernard Shaw. But several linked factors ensured
that it was far more widespread in the 1960s and arose from a broader social base than before. These included horror at
the neonatal disabilities caused by the morning sickness drug Thalidomide, which came to light in 1962 and burst ‘the
bubble of postwar optimism’ surrounding medical research.  At the same time, in their reports on Thalidomide and
other issues, the media adopted a more critical ‘watchdog’ stance in which they focused on social and ethical issues
instead of deferring to professional experts.
Criticism also reflected the emergence of a ‘new politics’ in the 1960s and 1970s, in which concerns over class identity
and economic security were replaced by an emphasis on human rights and individual autonomy.  Change was often
driven by the activities of the many ‘new social movements’ that incorporated civil rights and libertarian ideologies to
campaign on behalf of marginal groups.  These movements increasingly criticised professions as obstacles to
empowerment, as unaccountable and self-serving power blocs. Some of the more radical ones drew inspiration from
leftist academics such as the Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich, who claimed that medical control over definitions of
health and illness fostered a ‘debilitating’ client mentality among patients and was itself a major threat to health.
This was certainly the case with the National Association for Mental Health, which rebranded itself as MIND under the
leadership of the American lawyer Larry Gostin and began to expose professional misconduct and campaign for a
‘rights-based’ approach to mental illness.
But the ‘backlash against professional society’ did not emanate solely from new social movements, a critical media or
a disaffected public. Indeed, one of the earliest and strongest critiques of medicine, which contributed to public unease
and influenced campaign groups, came from the medical ‘whistleblower’ Maurice Pappworth. Born Maurice
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prevented him from obtaining consultant positions in London after he graduated from the University of Liverpool in
1932.  Rather than take a ‘peripheral’ hospital post, he decided to earn a living by tutoring junior doctors looking to
pass the diploma that controlled entry to the Royal College of Physicians (RCP). It was here that Pappworth learned of
questionable research practices, after his students told him that they were often expected to undertake experiments on
NHS patients without their full knowledge or consent.  While informed consent had been prioritised as ‘absolutely
essential’ by the Nuremberg Code that was drawn up during the Nazi medical trials, it was routinely ignored by
researchers in Britain, the United States and elsewhere, who believed the guidelines were designed to prosecute
‘barbarians’ and did not apply to them.
Pappworth was certainly not the first doctor to have misgivings about the lack of consent in medical research, but he
was the first to go public. In line with club regulation, doctors had previously kept their views ‘in house’ and refused to
openly criticise their colleagues. This was clear when Pappworth wrote letters to journals that published work which he
found to be ethically dubious, but the editors refused to publish them.  Frustration with these rejections led
Pappworth to break with protocol in 1962, when he published a short piece in the popular Twentieth Century magazine.
His article drew on a sample of published studies to claim that researchers often exposed patients to risky experiments,
including liver biopsies and withholding of insulin, without their ‘full consent, after honest and detailed explanation of
what was to be meted out to them’.
After listing fourteen questionable experiments, Pappworth detailed how animal experiments ‘were rigorously
controlled and supervised’ whereas ‘doctors can indulge in human vivisection without let or hindrance’.  He argued
that it was no longer sufficient to claim that ‘only the clinician in charge could say what was right and proper and what
safeguards were needed’.  But while he called for ‘proper safeguards’ to be introduced, Pappworth did not detail
what changes he felt were needed, other than recommending that ‘the investigator who is also the practising physician
in control of the patient cannot be the person best qualified to judge objectively the risk involved in any
experiment’.
The Twentieth Century article was published in the same year that the public learned the full scale of the Thalidomide
tragedy, and both played a significant role in generating disquiet over medical research. Pappworth’s call for a ‘battle
to defend the rights of all patients against the whims and ambitions of some doctors’ prompted the teacher Helen
Hodgson to establish the Patients Association in January 1963.  The Patients Association was one of the earliest and
most high-profile ‘new social movements’ concerned with healthcare, and regularly challenged medical paternalism in
letters to newspapers and professional journals.  Like other new social movements, the Patients Association
emphasised individual autonomy and claimed that patients had a fundamental right to choose whether or not they were
subjected to research.  It also, notably, demanded greater public involvement in the development of regulatory
guidelines for clinical research. In a 1963 letter to the British Medical Journal, Hodgson warned that patients ‘would
not be willing for much longer to submit blindly their health and their lives to any arbitrary code of ethics in which
they have no say’.
Pappworth’s work also caused unrest among doctors, who believed that he should have confined his critique to the
medical community.  Many tried to dissuade him from making further public claims, warning that he would seriously
undermine people’s faith in medicine. One senior doctor summarised these views in a letter to Pappworth several years
later, when he claimed that ‘in common with many people, I disliked your tactics as much as I approved of your
message’.  But despite the attempts of other doctors, Pappworth went ahead and published a longer book, entitled
Human Guinea Pigs, in 1967.
Human Guinea Pigs was similar to Pappworth’s earlier article in many respects, providing a long list of British and
American experiments that had been undertaken without valid consent, carried no therapeutic benefit and were often
dangerous. But it also differed thanks to a long final chapter that set out proposed legal changes and, notably, endorsed
outside involvement in the development and enforcement of new guidelines. At the outset of the book Pappworth
explained why he had contravened one of the main tenets of club regulation and encouraged ‘discussion outside
professional circles’.  Drawing on his own experiences, he argued that ‘little heed has been paid by the experimenters
themselves to the occasional voices raised in protest against these practices, and there has been, on the part of editors
of professional journals, some censorship of the expression of protest – presumably for fear of offending some of their
readers’.  The only way to adequately ‘stir the consciences of doctors’, Pappworth concluded, was to ‘enlighten the
public about what is going on in such experiments’.
But Pappworth also publicised his work because he believed, like Hodgson, that ‘the medical profession must no
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themselves’. He instead claimed that ethical issues in clinical research could only be solved ‘by frank discussion
among informed people, lay as well as medical’.  While Pappworth advocated ‘frank discussion’, he also called for
new and legally binding guidelines for clinical research. ‘After careful thought over many years’, he wrote, ‘I have
reluctantly come to the conclusion that the voluntary system of safeguarding patients’ rights has failed and new
legislative procedures are absolutely necessary.’
Pappworth saw outside involvement as vital here. He argued that in order to fully protect patients, ‘who are at present
exposed to dangers and indignity’, it was essential that ‘our laws do not place the entire authority to decide what is
permissible and what is not in the hands of a professional class’.  He recommended that Parliament should formulate
an Act that established ‘consultation committees’, which would review all research applications and ‘judge objectively
… whether or not any proposed experiment is legally and ethically justifiable’.  Pappworth proposed that every
regional hospital board should include a ‘consultation committee’ that was answerable to the GMC and Parliament.
Although he did not specify how many members they should have, he stressed that one ‘must be a clinician who is not
involved in research, and there should be at least one lay member, preferably but not necessarily a lawyer’.
By endorsing lay involvement in deciding whether research was ‘ethically justifiable’, Pappworth was clear in his
belief that medical ethics should no longer be a matter for doctors alone. This has led some to claim that his work was
a critical moment in ‘the birth of British bioethics’.  But this is far from the case. Pappworth’s arguments had little, if
any, impact on the continuing support for club regulation among doctors, politicians and other professions. While all
these groups agreed that aspects of clinical research were problematic, they maintained that responsibility for
implementing reforms should continue to rest with the medical profession.
Writing in the Times Literary Supplement, for example, the renowned geriatrician Lord Basil Amulree stated that
Pappworth had been ‘right to draw attention to this disquieting trend in medicine’ and acknowledged that it was ‘surely
undesirable to carry out any experiment on patients without their consent’. But Amulree disagreed with Pappworth in
his firm insistence that ‘it is the members of the profession itself … who can do most to ensure that this undesirable
and unethical form of experimentation ceases to be practised’.  Involving outsiders in developing guidelines, he
argued, would simply ensure that they were ‘difficult to draft and equally difficult to enforce’.
The Lancet, too, claimed that the best way to protect patients was by ensuring that ‘the difficult and important
decisions that research doctors have to make must be kept under constant review by other doctors’. Implementing
Pappworth’s recommendations, it continued, would ‘only lead to another ineffectual code of vague ethics’.  And in a
review for World Medicine, the doctor and epidemiologist Charles Fletcher, who was a longstanding critic of
Pappworth, pointedly dismissed his calls for lay involvement as a ‘quite impracticable’ measure that ‘could not
seriously have been proposed by anyone engaged in medical research’.
Parliament also continued to endorse laissez-faire attitudes to regulation. The vast majority of politicians echoed
Amulree, Fletcher and other doctors by rejecting outside involvement in clinical research. Members of Harold
Wilson’s Labour government, which had promised to turn scientific innovation into economic and material prosperity
when it won the 1964 election, were reluctant to interfere with professional expertise and believed the best solution
was for ‘the medical profession to put its house in order’.  This was made clear during a Commons debate that
followed the publication of Human Guinea Pigs in May 1967. The government’s Minister for Health, Kenneth
Robinson, rejected the Labour MP Joyce Butler’s call for a public inquiry and claimed that hospital authorities and the
MRC already provided researchers with ‘comprehensive guidance’.  The government reiterated its position the
following year, when the Ministry of Health rebuffed the Patients Association’s demands for a public inquiry and
claimed that ethical questions were ‘for the profession to consider’.  In 1969 the Conservative MP Quintin Hogg,
who had previously endorsed laissez-faire approaches as Minister for Science, told Pappworth that external regulation
was highly unlikely as ‘I do not myself think that Parliament is in the position in which positive legislation can be
imposed without detriment to the freedom of the medical profession’.
Pappworth’s recommendations also found little support from other professions, who maintained their ‘hands-off’
stance into the 1960s despite the ‘backlash against professional society’. Reviewing Human Guinea Pigs for the BBC’s
Listener magazine, the philosopher Bernard Williams said nothing about Pappworth’s call for lay involvement and
statutory regulation, and dwelt instead on whether the ‘Golden Rule’ was an appropriate ethical safeguard for research:
that is, whether it was sufficient to argue that doctors should not submit patients to a procedure they would not be
willing to undertake on themselves or their families.  In line with the Bolam test, lawyers also maintained that
doctors should be left to determine their own conduct and standards of care. In a long letter to Pappworth, the lawyer
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sense you suggest’.  Clothier also claimed that legal guidelines would be overly restrictive, as notions of acceptable
risks and safeguards differed between individual patients and specific research projects. He outlined how one patient
might demand full information while another might not care, and stated that prioritising informed consent was
inappropriate when a doctor was faced with an unconscious patient whose only chance of survival ‘could include
trying a newly-devised drug if nothing else had done any good’. These complications, Clothier argued, ensured that
‘individual assessment’ remained the best form of governance for doctors.
Under no pressure to implement change, either from politicians or other professions, doctors largely ignored
Pappworth’s recommendations. This was clear in 1967 when an RCP committee, comprised solely of doctors,
produced a short report that proposed the formation of research ethics committees (RECs) to review applications for
projects ‘where the subject, be he a patient or a normal person, cannot expect clinical benefit’.  The apparent
similarity between this proposal and Human Guinea Pigs led Pappworth to claim that he had influenced the RCP.
But as one doctor informed him years later, the RCP’s decision ‘antedated your book’ and was prompted by changing
grant policies in the United States, where the Public Health Service (PHS) stated that it would only fund research if an
applicant’s institution had conducted a prior ethical review.  The RCP report clearly stated that RECs should be
established at hospitals where researchers ‘were in receipt’ of or were likely to seek PHS money. They also predicted
that RECs would assess proposals from British funding bodies once established, since ‘it is unlikely they will feel they
can sensibly confine their attentions solely to cases where research is sponsored by a foreign country’.
The RCP committee’s attitude to outside involvement highlights the extent to which doctors ignored Pappworth. In
marked contrast to Human Guinea Pigs, it proposed that RECs should be composed of ‘a group of doctors including
those experienced in clinical investigation’.  When ‘difficult ethical problems arise’, it claimed, ‘even the most
experienced workers would often welcome the opinion and advice of their peers’. The RCP committee dismissed any
outside involvement or formal regulation when it argued that it was
of great importance that clinical investigation should be free to proceed without unnecessary interference and
delay. Imposition of rigid or central bureaucratic controls would be likely to deter doctors from undertaking
investigations, and if this were to happen, the rate of growth in medical knowledge would inevitably diminish
with resultant delay in advances in medical care.
The responses to a 1971 survey show that the vast majority of hospitals followed the RCP’s proposals when they
established RECs. Only one-fifth of those set up after 1967 included a lay member, who was generally the hospital or
group secretary, and none included more than one.  If this were not testament enough to the continued strength of
club regulation, it was officially endorsed by a government inquiry into the structure and function of the GMC, which
had been established in 1972 following professional unrest at the decision to ‘strike off’ any doctor who did not pay a
new annual retainer fee.  When the committee’s report was published in 1975, it unanimously agreed that staffing the
GMC predominantly with doctors safeguarded the public, since ‘it is the essence of professional skill that it deals with
matters unfamiliar to the layman’.  Despite Pappworth’s efforts, and to his continued frustration, responsibility for
deciding ethical issues continued to rest ‘firmly on the shoulders of the medical profession’.
Conclusion
This evidence undermines claims that Maurice Pappworth made a ‘significant contribution to the development of
medical research ethics’ and that ‘Human Guinea Pigs is a major milestone on the journey towards the modern system
of research ethics committee review’.  While Pappworth’s work alerted the public to the ethical issues associated
with clinical experiments, and contributed to a broader critique of professional expertise, it had little impact on the
governance of medical research or treatment. Several writers have sought to explain Pappworth’s lack of influence by
claiming that his confrontational manner ‘alienated most of his audience’ and that he ‘was not an authoritative figure in
medical circles’.  These are certainly valid points. Journal editors and correspondents were often irritated by the
strident tone of Pappworth’s correspondence, while Cecil Clothier argued that he might have a more sympathetic
audience if he moderated his ‘candour’.  It is also clear that senior doctors often used Pappworth’s lack of
professional status to dismiss his work, with Charles Fletcher, for one, claiming that it was the product of an embittered
outsider and would not have arisen from ‘anyone engaged in medical research’.
But while his manner and status did not help, I believe that Pappworth was mainly ignored because his calls for outside
involvement conflicted with the longstanding and continued support for club regulation among doctors, politicians and



































Sections of Human Guinea Pigs certainly resemble later work in bioethics, not least its calls for patient empowerment
and lay involvement, but portraying Pappworth as significant to the development of bioethics involves reading history
backwards and reduces bioethics to little more than a public critique of medicine and science, which is far from the
case. Bioethics is a multi-sited and interdisciplinary set of activities, and we cannot attribute its emergence to a single
event or figure.
What is more, the fact remains that bioethics only became a recognised term and approach in Britain once politicians,
doctors, lawyers, philosophers and others came to believe that external involvement with medicine and science
benefited patients, professions and the public. This was clearly not the case in the 1960s, when they all agreed that
doctors should retain ‘jurisdictional control’ over their own practices.  Instead of mistakenly trying to see Pappworth
as influential to bioethics, then, we need to concentrate on the broad changes that led politicians, lawyers, philosophers
and theologians to adopt a more ‘hands-on’ approach in decades to come.
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